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Abstract 
Variations between the diverse pension systems in the member states of the European Union 
hamper labour market mobility, across country borders but also within the countries of the 
European Union. From a macroeconomic perspective, and in the light of demographic pressure, 
this paper argues that allowing individual instead of collective pension building would greatly 
improve labour market flexibility and thus enhance the functioning of the monetary union. I 
argue that working citizens would benefit, for three reasons, from pension saving in a risk-free 
savings account. First, citizens would have a clear picture of the accumulation of their own 
pension savings throughout their working life. Second, they would pay hardly any extra costs 
and, third, once retired they would not be subject to the whims of government or other pension 
fund  managers.  This  paper  investigates  the  feasibility  of  individual  pension  building  under 
various  parameter  settings  by  calculating  the  pension  saved  during  a  working  life  and  the 
pension  dis-saved  after  retirement.  The  findings  show  that  there  are  no  reasons  why  the 
European Union and individual member states should not allow individual risk-free pension 
savings  accounts.  This  would  have  macroeconomic  benefits  and  provide  a  solid  pension 
provision  that  can  enhance  mobility,  instead  of  engaging  workers  in  different  mandatory 
collective pension schemes that exist around in the European Union.  
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1.  Introduction 
One in ten European citizens has lived in more than one European Union country, usually for 
work reasons. Job-mobility is an indicator of the flexibility of the labour market and is vital for 
the well-functioning of the European Economic and Monetary Union. Nevertheless, individual 
workers are hampered by the patchwork of social security systems across the Union. Workers 
who frequently switch jobs participate in various pension schemes from different governments 
and  pension  funds  and  tend  to  lose  sight  of  their  rights  and  entitlements.  This  lack  of 
transparency for the job-switching working EU citizen is particularly unfortunate as pension 
payments can amount to 30% of his gross salary. 
Each of the 27 member states of the EU has its own pension system existing of a first, often 
second and also third pillar (see also Holzmann and Palacios, 2001). All countries have a state 
pension system as the first pillar, yet pension payments and pension outcomes differ. Some 
countries have a pay-as-you-go system as the second pillar while others have a funded system 
and  both  these  systems  exist  in  many  different  forms.  The  third  pillar  consists  of  private 
savings. The lack of coherence between all these different systems does not encourage labour 
mobility within countries and definitely hampers mobility across the EU borders.  
Pension contributions are usually mandatory and collective. In most EU-countries, citizens have 
no direct say in how these funds are invested and can only hope that the outcome will be 
sufficient for their retirement. The global financial crisis of 2008-09 did not improve matters 
and  has  had  a  negative impact on  the EU-citizens’  confidence in  institutional  investors  and 
Ministries  of  Finance  as  the  guardians  of  their  pension  funds.  In  countries  where  pension 
systems  depend  on  investment  returns  the  situation  has  worsened  as  monetary  policy  has 
loosened,  stock  markets  have  been  volatile  and  depressed,  and  the  safe  haven  of  the 
government bond has been under pressure. Moreover, the poor state of public finances in many 
EU countries casts a shadow over pension payments by governments of the future. Due to high 
public debt and high public deficits, state-pension payments are more under pressure than ever 
before. For this reason, citizens need to have a clear picture of their pension funds during their 
(long)  working  and  retirement  life.  Individual  risk-free  pension  schemes  could  provide  full 
clarity but only under the precondition that pension savings accumulated during a working life 
are  sufficient  to  cover  the  total  pension  payments  throughout  the  estimated  length  of 
retirement life.  3  
 
This paper looks at the individual risk-free pension scheme and examines the advantages it 
could offer working European Union citizens who wish to cross national borders during their 
careers. The life plans of an average worker in the EU will be explored in terms of different 
parameter settings looking at: salary growth, pension savings, length of working life, number of 
years in retirement, the level of pension payments and the rates of return on savings. Analyses 
will show whether the individual risk-free pension scheme is feasible and whether the average 
worker  would  be  able  to  make  ends  meet.  The  advantages  are  discussed  from  an  average 
worker’s point of view and from a macroeconomic perspective and examined in the light of 
counterarguments. Relevant literature will be cited although there is currently not much known 
about individual risk-free pension schemes as they do not seem to be in use except in Chile. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses labour mobility in the EU from a 
macro point of view in-depth. Section 3 studies an individual EU-worker’s income during his 
lifespan.  Section  4  generalises  the  individual  example  given  in  section  3  and  analyses  the 
outcomes for  pension savings  under  different  parameter settings  in order  to  study  the  pay 
ability of an individual worker. Section 5 summarizes the main benefits of an individual risk-
free pension scheme for an individual EU worker. Section 6 gives counterarguments, asking the 
question why we should not be in favour of an individual risk-free pension scheme. Section 7 
summarizes, concludes and gives recommendations for policy steps. 
 
2.  The importance of labour mobility and the role of pensions  
The European Economic and Monetary Union in which seventeen economies have a common 
monetary  policy  and  common  currency,  is  in  need  of  further  economic  integration.  Only 
adjustment mechanisms in either public finance or the labour market are able to mitigate the 
effects of asymmetric shocks. The asymmetric shocks  that hit several member states in the 
aftermath  of  the  global  economic  crisis  (2008-09)  caused  sovereign  debt  crises  in  Greece, 
Ireland  and  Portugal.  Common  monetary  policy  cannot  be  adapted  to  target  these  problem 
countries specifically. Exchange rates are fixed and interest rates are basically common and 
therefore  not  feasible  policy  instruments  for  countries  hit  by  asymmetric  shocks.  As  a 
consequence, in the absence of a common fiscal policy, a good functioning labour market is 
crucial (see also Peeters and Den Reijer, 2012;  Jousten and Pestieau, 2002; Razin and Sadka, 
1999).  4  
 
Quickly matching labour supply and labour demand would not increase unemployment levels 
and flexible wages would function as a price mechanism to match supply and demand. Excess 
labour supply in certain countries or regions in the EU could cancel out excess labour demand in 
other areas of the EU. Flexible labour-markets cushion the effects of asymmetric shocks and can 
absorb or even prevent future shocks. Moreover, a flexible labour market can keep wage growth 
moderate,  which  improves  international  competitiveness  and  helps  in  maintaining  price 
stability. However, a precondition for flexible labour-market functioning is that people are in a 
position (both financially and socially) to move from one region to another and thus supply 
their labour. 
The literature shows that labour market mobility in the EU has been low (see for instance 
Huber, 2004; Cavelaars and Hessel, 2007), although each EU citizen has the right to live and 
work in every other country in the EU. As a positive token, labour mobility within the EU is 
increasing (see Table 1 in Peeters, 2011; European Commission, 2011). In view of demographic 
developments in the EU, the expectation is that there will be more pressure to increase labour 
mobility in the future decades. According to the population projections of the United Nations all 
EU countries are ageing. In terms of the production of goods, the supply of services, but also 
fiscal spending on older citizens, this means less support. A decreasing group of working-age 
citizens will have to provide health care and other services for an increasing group of elderly. 
Only a flexible labour market will be able to ensure enough qualified workers are available to fill 
existing job vacancies. Unless working-age people, who currently do not work full-time, become 
fully available in the labour market place, demographic pressure will encourage more cross-
border movement of workers. Temporary contracts, offering people fees to be hired rapidly, will 
also be conducive to the functioning of the labour market, as demand can meet supply timely. 
Peeters and Groot (2011) show that, in terms of labour market space availability and future 
fiscal  expenditure  on  old-age  pensions,  among  the  European  countries,  the  Czech  Republic, 
Poland and Greece will suffer most from the aging populations. 
Pensions, in particular the non-state pensions, are a major impediment to labour mobility (see 
European Commission, 2010a,b; Cavelaars and Hessel, 2007). In most EU countries, domestic 
pension portability is not easy. Switching jobs often means that the accumulated pension funds 
remain with the previous pension fund and are not carried over to the fund connected with the 
new position (see Zaidi et al., 2006; OECD, 2011; Arza and Kohli, 2008; Börsch-Supan, 2006). 
Between  EU  countries,  pension  portability  is  even  more  difficult,  costly  and  sometimes 
impossible. Regulatory systems differ widely and switching jobs is time consuming and entails 5  
 
high administrative costs. An individual worker who changes jobs is faced with a fragmented 
pension fund accumulation that is located with various previous and current employer(s) (see 
European Commission, 2010a). 
Fragmented pension savings and a lack of transparency about the outcome of future pension 
benefits, makes people wary. In their search for job market opportunities, they will tend to look 
within  their own  countries  rather  than  go  across  the  border  to  a  neighbouring  EU country 
unless wages are significantly higher (such as between the east and the west of the EU, for 
instance). A worker who is mobile and switches jobs within the EU is not only faced with huge 
differences in the public pension schemes, but also a wide variety of private schemes across EU-
countries. Private schemes are even more varied, as some countries have mandatory and other 
non-mandatory schemes, again with different sizes of contributions and different associated 
benefit outcomes. The accumulated pension entitlements on retirement are thus a patchwork of 
different schemes (see Adema and Ladaique, 2009). Even if there is an overview of the pension 
benefits available this is not easy to understand. 
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, labour mobility should be stimulated instead of hampered, 
so mobile workers should be rewarded not punished. As the average working lifetime is long, 
notably more than 40 years, people usually only start to think about the effective result of their 
pension funds at a late stage. At that point in life, it is often more difficult to catch-up with lost or 
low savings. If the accumulated savings do not suffice for covering, let us say, 30 years after 
retirement from the labour market, the worker could seek opportunities to replenish the funds. 
Finding another job with a better salary or working more hours is generally easier for younger 
workers who are more flexible.  
In  the  literature,  researchers  discuss  the  problems  workers  have  in  adapting  to  a  different 
cultural environment or housing as the obstructions to labour market mobility within the EU. 
But adapting pensions would be a more effective policy instrument as this can be implemented 
by  policy  makers  whereas  it  is  more  difficult  to  overcome  workers  cultural  preferences. 
Financial or material goods can be provided, but the important aspect of integrating and settling 
into a new culture or living environment depends on the individual worker. In contrast, it is 
easier for the policy makers to adapt the pension system to encourage migrant workers. As 
pensions are deferred salaries, it is a matter of offering the worker the best prospects for future 
pension payments. Pensions can thus be used as a policy instrument to attract working-age 
persons  to  jobs  elsewhere  in  the  EU.  This  holds  for  fixed  tenure  jobs  but  especially  for 
temporary jobs and would help fill the labour market vacancies in the EU that are hard to fill. I 6  
 
only need to define what best prospects means. Whatever the case, from a worker’s perspective, 
policies that allow the accumulation of pension-savings independent of any EU-employer are the 
best choice (see Borgy and Chojnicki, 2008; Jarret, 2011). 
This brings us to pension portability in its easiest form, the feasibility of pension scheme for an 
individual worker, mandatory but risk-free saving. I analyse under which parameter settings 
such a pension scheme breaks even or exceeds the pension needs at retirement. Thereafter, I 
come back to possible disadvantages or differences of pension systems that are individual or 
collective  or  otherwise.  This  section  can  be  summarized  as  follows.  An  individual  pension 
scheme in the EU is conducive to labour mobility, and hence the functioning of the EU labour 
market, as it helps encouraging workers to cross borders to accept jobs. 
 
3.  Illustrative example of an individual risk-free pension scheme for Mr X 
This  section  clarifies  the  specific  meaning  in  this  paper  of  individual  and  risk-free  pension 
scheme, by using an example of a representative worker in the EU. I call this person Mr X. 
Mr X starts working at the age of 22 and retires at the official retirement age of 67 years. He 
starts with an annual salary of € 20,000 that increases at 2% each year, a rise that is equal to the 
annual inflation rate during his full 45 years’ working life. According to wage bargaining or 
regulation agreements, Mr X saves 7% of his salary and his employer contributes twice this 
amount. He and his employer deposit these pension contributions in a tax-free savings account 
in a bank. The savings account carries Mr X’s name, so Mr X is the only owner. However, Mr X 
has no access to the funds deposited until he reaches retirement age. This is a so-called blocked 
account, in that the owner of the account, and anybody else, can deposit money but neither the 
owner, nor anyone else, can withdraw money until the fixed savings term has passed, coinciding 
with retirement age. After the fixed term has passed the owner, Mr X in this case, is entitled to 
use the money and, in this example, his savings will have accrued at a fixed interest rate of 4% 
each year. 
Figure 1 (dotted line) shows the development of the salaries of Mr X during a working life of 45 
years, from 22 to 67 years of age. At the age of 66, his salary is almost €49,000, so the salary 
more than doubled due to the 2% salary-growth during 45 years with year-on-year increases. 
Figure 1 (dark line) illustrates also the accrued funds in the savings account. At a retirement age 
of 67 these funds will have reached €720,000 (as indicated at the right axis). This nest egg 7  
 
consists  of  the  pension  contributions  and  the  savings  due  to  interest,  roughly  300,000  to 
400,000  euros.  Therefore,  the  interest  savings  are  higher  than  the  pension  contribution, 
showing the importance of receiving interest over interest over a long period.  
Figure 1 Mr X’s salaries, pension benefits and accumulation of pension funds 
in euros 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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At the age of 67, Mr X’s account is unblocked and he starts withdrawing money at 70% of his 
last earned salary being €35,000 (=€49,000*0.7). This is his pension benefit (see  line in Figure 
1). In the subsequent years, he withdraws the same amount as the previous year but with an 
increase of 2% to compensate for consumer price inflation. He can do this up until the age of 94, 
when his savings reach zero. As the graph illustrates, the decumulation of his savings takes 
place in a non-linear way, the reason being that the remaining money in the savings account is 
still receiving a 4% interest rate. Because of the fixed long-term savings plan, this interest rate 
has remained the same over the working and retirement period. 
This last feature is important. It indicates that the saved contributions are long-term savings 
and therefore accrue at a relatively high interest rate. Mr X saves the first pension contribution 
earned at the age of 22 for 45 years. He saves the pension contribution earned at age 23 also for 
45 years, as at the age of 67 he only consumes a small sum of money in view of all the interest 
accrued on his first salary (earned at the age of 22) this suffices. 
Mr X does not necessarily have to work his whole life in the same country or with the same 
employer. The only relevant parameters in this example are his starting wage (€20,000), the 
length of his working life (45 years), his annual salary increase (2%), the pension contributions 
(21% of his salary, of which 7% contributed by the employee and thus 14% by the employer), 
the  interest  rate  on  savings  (4%)  and  the  replacement  rate  at  retirement  (70%  of  the  last 
earned salary). The outcome is that Mr X has secure pension benefits for more than 25 years. 
Consumer price inflation equalling the nominal increase in the salaries as well as the pension 
benefits, the real income remains at the same level during Mr X’s whole life. To what extent 
various combinations of these parameters could lead to higher life cycle income outcomes is 
examined in the next section.  
The  pension  scheme  described  in  this  example  is  individual  as  Mr  X  possesses  all  his 
accumulated funds in a bank account that is only in his name. The scheme is risk-free, due to the 
fact that Mr X receives a fixed interest rate, independent of financial market or other factors of 
uncertainty. Furthermore, this scheme is mandatory, as Mr X has to save for his pension and 
cannot use the accumulated funds for consumption purposes before his retirement. Finally, to 
use the terminology of pension literature and pension policy discussions, the employer and 
employee have negotiated the pension contributions and not the future pension benefits, so the 
scheme is a defined contribution (DC) and not a defined benefit (DB). In all these aspects, this 
scheme is thus rather basic.  9  
 
4.  Straightforward specifications and scenario analyses 
This section specifies in general terms Mr X’s lifetime income. The resulting inequality is used to 
show pension outcomes under different parameter settings. 
 
        4.1  Individual risk-free pension savings specification 
The pension contributions saved in year t, denoted as   , are based on the initial gross wage,   , 
that grows with   and depends on the rate of pension contributions  . It follows that 
 
            (     )  
(1) 
With   the nominal savings interest rate, the accumulated pension savings are at the end of the 
working life of T years, 
                  ∑   
 
   
(     )    
(2) 
Assuming the pension period to be K years, the stream of the pension benefits    at the age of 
retirement at period T reads as follows  
                ∑
  
(     ) 
 
   
 
(3) 
with r the nominal discount rate. In the example of Mr X, as discussed in the previous section, 
this  discount  rate  equals  the  nominal  savings  interest  rate,  so       .  I  generalise  in  this 
specification  and  allow  for  the  possibility  that  Mr  X  can  dispose  of  his  savings  after  his 
retirement  for  which  reason  these  are  no  longer  long-term  savings,  which  may,  therefore, 
mature at a lower interest rate, hence      . 
 
The pension replacement rate,  , defines the first pension benefit in relation to the last earned 
wage,   . Adjusted for the consumer price inflation, 
              (     ) 
(4a) 
and in the subsequent years this first pension benefit grows again at the inflation rate  , so 
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          (     )     for              
(4b) 
It should hold that individuals save as much money during their working lives as needed for 
their  retirement.  I  will  consider  this  a  requirement,  and  take  the  retirement  age  as 
measurement point in time, that is year T. The total lifetime income Ω in year T, that is the 
stream of pension savings at retirement age T minus the stream of pension needs during the K 
retirement years, should thus be positive, that is  
                                      0 
(5) 
Substituting (2) and (3) in (5), and subsequently substituting (1) and (4a)-(4b) for S and P, 
respectively, it then holds that 
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(6) 
with     
   
    and     
   
   .  
This last inequality states that the initial pension savings (      ) should precisely match or 
exceed the pension benefit in the retirement year (      ), where this pension saving is accrued 
to  the  retirement  moment  by  the  first  term  in  curly  brackets  and  this  pension  benefit  is 
discounted with the second term in curly brackets. Logically, the higher the wage growth   
during the working life, the higher the accrual of pension funds (term left of the inequality sign). 
In the same vein, the higher the pension benefit growth  , the higher the pension needs (term 
right of the equality sign). However, while the nominal savings rate ( ) pushes savings upward 
(term left of the equality sign), higher nominal savings rates after retirement (r) depress the 11  
 
pension needs as the remaining savings accrue more quickly. As an extreme case, which is 
illustrative, assuming                  , it follows that  
                        
This implies that the initial pension saving times the number of working years should precisely 
match or exceed the initial pension benefit multiplied by the number of retirement years. It is 
the example of a non-growing economy without inflation, wage growth or interest payments. 
At second sight, this case is not so extreme as the same inequality holds in case the (wage or 
price)  inflation  on  income  equals  the  nominal  interest  rate  during  the  working  and  the 
retirement life, that is       and      . This is the case where the return on savings vanishes due 
to relatively high wage or pension benefit inflation. 
As it holds that the pension contribution at the moment of retirement is simply the first earned 
pension contribution accrued with the wage growth, that is           (     ) , substitution in 
equation (6) gives after division of both sides by      (     )  
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(7) 
Interestingly,  this  shows  that  the  initial  wage  plays  no  role  in  making  the  pension  savings 
exactly match or exceed the pension needs. The reason is that a person with a high wage will 
proportionately have also a high pension benefit, and a person with a relatively low wage a 
relatively low pension benefit. However, the parameters that indicate the amount of pension 
contribution ( ) and the pension replacement rate ( ) as a proportion of the initial wage, play a 
crucial role. Apart from these two parameters, there are six other key parameters. 
To summarize, inequality (7) contains the following parameters: 
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1.  The pension contribution rate  . 
2.  The wage growth rate  . 
3.  The length of the working life  . 
4.  The nominal rate of return on savings  . 
5.  The pension replacement rate  . 
6.  The growth rate of pension benefits  . 
7.  The length of the retirement period  . 
8.  The discount rate of pension payments  . 
In the examples below, I assume that some of these parameters are fixed and I show outcomes 
for differing values for the other parameters.  
 
4.2  Pension outcomes under different scenario settings 
Figure 2 shows preliminary findings, where (7) was used at equality. I first show the trade-off 
between  the  number  of  working  to  retirement  years,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  pension 
contribution to replacement rate, on the other hand. The more years a person works, the lower 
is the pension contribution rate that this person needs ceteris paribus. In the same vein, the 
more  years  a  person  needs  pension  benefits  after  retiring,  the  lower  must  be  the  pension 
replacement rate ceteris paribus in order for the equality to hold. To illustrate this in an example 
with numbers, there is a dotted line at the point on the horizontal axis where T/K=40/20=2 that 
points at a situation in which the individual worker wants to accumulate pension savings for a 
retirement period of 20 years during a working life period of 40 years (case A). Following the 
dotted  line  upwards,  one  reaches  the  dark  line,  being  the  isoquant  that  gives  the  border 
between the left area where the inequality (7) does not hold, and the right area where it holds. 
Following then the dotted line to the left, one reaches the vertical axis at point 0.27. This is the 
pension contribution for replacement rate. Assuming that replacement rate is 0.7, this implies 
that the pension contribution is 19%. This is less than in the example with Mr X in the previous 
section.  Sharing  the  contributions  with  the  employer  and  assuming  that  the  employer 
contributes double that of the worker, it implies that the worker only has to save little more 
than 6% of his wage. Thus, a worker with a retirement period of 20 year, and replacement rate 
of 0.7, needs to work at least 40 years if he and his employer pay 19% on pension contributions 
(by him and his employer together). Or, if he works less than 40 years, they should at least pay a 
pension contribution of more than 19%.  13  
 
If  this  worker  only  worked  20  years,  followed  by  a  retirement  period  of  20  years,  the 
contribution would need to rise considerably. In this case T/K=20/20=1 which shows (see the 
dark line) that the pension contribution should be at least 0.7 times the replacement rate. This is 
case  B  in  the  figure.  Assuming  again  a  replacement  rate  of  0.7,  this  implies  that  pension 
contribution  would  have  to  rise  to  almost  50%,  so  little  over  16%  for  the  employee  if  the 
employer contributes 33%. Interestingly, if the employee works 30 years and has a retirement 
period of 30 years, the situation at the isoquant with the  doted line holds. See case C. In this 
case, the ratio of the pension contribution to the replacement rate drops to 0.6, and pension 
contribution of 40% holds for the replacement rate to remain at 0.7. Working for 10 years 
longer  is  thus  proportionally  more  beneficial  as  the  accumulation  of  funds  significantly 
increases and this ensures the payment of pension benefits for a much longer period (see also 
Table 1). 
Figure 2 Trade-off contribution-to-replacement rate and work-to retirement years 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation according to equation (7). 
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Table 1 Required pension contribution rate with different parameter settings 
savings interest rate  ρ=0.0  ρ=0.02  ρ=0.04  ρ=0.06  ρ=0.08 
number of working years             
T=30  0.79  0.60  0.45  0.33  0.23 
T=35  0.71  0.52  0.37  0.25  0.17 
T=40  0.65  0.45  0.30  0.19  0.12 
T=45  0.60  0.40  0.25  0.15  0.09 
number of retirement years             
K=20  0.55  0.42  0.31  0.23  0.16 
K=25  0.68  0.52  0.38  0.28  0.20 
K=30  0.79  0.60  0.45  0.33  0.23 
K=35  0.90  0.69  0.51  0.37  0.27 
pension replacement rate             
μ=0.5  0.57  0.43  0.32  0.23  0.17 
μ=0.6  0.68  0.52  0.39  0.28  0.20 
μ=0.7  0.79  0.60  0.45  0.33  0.23 
μ=0.8  0.91  0.69  0.51  0.37  0.27 
salary growth                
δ=0.01  0.70  0.52  0.38  0.28  0.19 
δ=0.02  0.79  0.60  0.45  0.33  0.23 
δ=0.03  0.90  0.69  0.52  0.39  0.28 
δ=0.04  1.01  0.79  0.60  0.45  0.33 
pension benefit growth             
π=0.01  0.69  0.52  0.39  0.28  0.20 
π=0.02  0.79  0.60  0.45  0.33  0.23 
π=0.03  0.92  0.70  0.52  0.38  0.27 
π=0.04  1.07  0.82  0.61  0.44  0.32 
savings rate on pension funds during retirement          
r=0.01  1.07  0.82  0.61  0.44  0.32 
r=0.02  0.92  0.70  0.52  0.38  0.27 
r=0.03  0.79  0.60  0.45  0.33  0.23 
r=0.04  0.69  0.53  0.39  0.28  0.20 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on equation (7).  
Note:  The  standard  scenario  sets  the  parameters  at  T=30,  K=30,         ,                and 
        . Values in bold highlight the cases with pension contribution at or lower than 45%. 
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As can be seen in Table 1, which presents an overview of the required pension contribution rate 
in case of different parameter settings, there are ample cases where this contribution is at or 
below 45% (that is 15% for the employee if the employer pays 30%). In the standard scenario 
the parameters are set at T=30, K=30,        ,              and         . The savings interest 
rate during the working life varies from 0% to 8% in steps of two percentage points, column-
wise. As can be seen in the top row, a working life of 30 years and a savings interest rate of 4% 
requires a pension contribution of 45%. Increasing the working life to 45 years makes this 
contribution  decrease  to  25%.  Increasing  the  working  life  thus  significantly  decreases  the 
contribution.  At  this  interest  rate  on  savings  if  keeping  the  working  life  at  30  years,  but 
decreasing the replacement rate from 0.7 to 0.5 of the last earned salary shifts the pension 
contribution  from  45%  to  32%,  as  follows  from  the  third  panel.  Combined  scenarios  are 
particularly interesting, for instance with this 4% savings interest rate, the working life of 45 
years and a replacement rate of 0.5 makes the required pension contribution falls to only 18% 
(not  shown  in  Table  1,  but  is  computable  by  interpolation).  Only  cases  where  the  savings 
interest rate is zero are impossible situations. In such cases the pension contribution would 
need to be exorbitantly high because the accumulation of funds stagnates. Most other situations 
would be acceptable, even if   is only 2%. 
In real life, however, an individual worker cannot influence certain factors. Savings and inflation 
rates, but also salary growth, are impossible to influence. A worker can however choose to work 
longer or to agree to a lower pension replacement rate. If it is assumed that a worker does not 
want to pay together with the contribution by his employer, a higher pension contribution than 
45%,  he  can  work  out  his  combination  of  working  life  and  replacement  that  meets  this 
requirement. A possibility is that he works 35 years and receives 80% of his last earned salary 
as  pension  benefits  after  retirement.  Or,  alternatively,  he  compromises  on  50%  of  his  last 
earned salary, in which case he only needs to work 25 years. This can be seen in Figure 3, where 
the dark line gives all possible combinations of the replacement rate and the number of working 
years for        . Opting for a lower pension contribution rate, of 30%, automatically implies 
that the worker has to work longer at the same replacement rate or needs to agree with a lower 
replacement rate at the same number of working years.  
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Figure 3 Trade-off between working year and replacement rate at fixed contribution rate 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation according to equation (7). 
 
All in all, these calculations show that in terms of feasibility there are various options available 
to individual workers to ensure that they have enough income during their lives even if savings 
interest rates are moderate. Moreover, in view of the monetary policy objective of price stability 
in the European Economic and Monetary Union, inflation and nominal interest tend to move in 
line with each other so there is hardly a risk of loss of purchasing power. If inflation increases, 
(policy)  interest  rates  tend  to  increase,  which  keeps  the  value  of  the  savings  in  the  fund 
constant. For this reason the pension benefits keep their value in real terms. 
 
5.  Benefits of individual risk-free pension schemes for workers 
The example in section 3 showed Mr X’s pension scheme during his life and the generalisations 
made in the previous section once more underline the possibility of pension savings for a long 
retirement  period  of  even  30  years  or  more  with  reasonable  pension  contributions  under 
various settings of the savings rate, inflation and the replacement rate. From the viewpoint of 
the worker, there are obvious advantages to this individual pension scheme in comparison with 
a collective pension scheme. Moreover, also the risk-free characteristic associated with savings 
has special advantages. 
5
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First of all, the accumulation and, after retirement, decumulation of funds is transparent for the 
worker. By placing the funds in an individual bank account that the worker owns no one else 
can interfere, deduct money or change the lump sum apart from the interest payments that are 
deposited by the bank to the blocked account. This contrasts sharply with the pension schemes 
around in many EU countries, where workers have no way of seeing the nominal values of their 
pension schemes are developing during their working life. It is often only when the retirement 
age  approaches,  that  the  worker  becomes  aware  of  his  pending  pension  benefits.  More 
transparency not only makes workers more aware, it can also help them decide whether they 
need  to  work  more  or  less  according  their  future  income  wishes  (see  also  Holzmann  and 
Palacios, 2001). In addition, if there are motives to leave bequests for survivors there will be a 
personal incentive to work more. The lump sum of money that the worker sees accumulating in 
the bank account is an accurate reflection of what has been earned and what will be paid out once 
the account is unblocked at retirement. 
I like to cite here Sinha (2002), who compares the Latin American individual pension accounts 
with the US system that claimed to make on average a 6% rate of return, as it applies here also: 
Even if the stock markets produce a better rate of return it does not follow that the affiliates of 
the pension fund, even with 100 percent investment in stocks, will get the same rate of return. 
The reason is, of course, the ubiquitous management fees that can eat up much (if not all) of the 
gain. See also Barr and Diamond (2006) on the size of administration costs with individual 
accounts. See also Hinz et al. (2000). It is furthermore interesting to point out that a 6% stock 
market  return  is  overly  optimistic.  During  1921-1996  this  held  for  the  US,  but  other  stock 
markets worldwide had, including dividends, a far lower return (see Jorion and Goetzmann, 
1999). 
Second, by saving in a simple risk-free bank savings account, the worker incurs next to no costs. 
An  ordinary  bank  savings  account  cost  10  to  30  euros  a  year  in  2010,  for  complete 
administration of the account. There is no reason for banks to charge more costs, as in the case 
of individual risk-free savings accounts  they possesses the funds of the worker over a long 
period until the worker’s retirement age due to the blocked character of the account. Using this 
money for other purposes is at the risk of the bank, and not of the worker. The pension savings 
should thus also be fully covered by the national deposit guarantee system.  
As investment in equity or bonds does not take place, there are no trading costs or additional 
costs for governing a portfolio of investments. Average operational costs of collective pension 
funds in 14 countries of the EU, ranging from 0.1% (Denmark, Portugal) to more than 1.0% 18  
 
(Czech Republic, Spain) of the total assets (see Graph 7 in Peeters, 2011). The simple average is 
0.5% and thus relatively high in comparison with the fixed costs of 10 to 30 euros a year for a 
bank savings account. These costs significantly depress returns (comparable with our   in the 
previous section). Moreover, the OECD does not yet have information about the costs made in 
the remaining 13 countries of the EU and this may indicate that the average costs in the EU are 
even higher. 
Third, with individual pension schemes, workers will no longer be subject to the whims of a 
government  or  other  pension fund managers  during  or  after  retirement in  case  of an. This 
independence is a valuable advantage that is not part of most pension schemes in the EU. If 
workers are part of a scheme governed by the government, the pension funds risk being used to 
fill the holes of public finance deficits, although this is not ethical and sometimes even illegal. 
However, history has shown that ministers of finance, in need of funds and under pressure by 
the public can be tempted to use pension funds to pay for current expenditures. The dire state of 
public finances related to the sovereign debt crisis, such as in the economies at the rim of the 
EU, increases the likelihood of this happening (see Van Groezen et al., 2009). If a government is 
likely to need the pension funds to use for public funding, the greater the incentive to keep its 
workers in the dark about the state of their pension schemes. In countries where other funds’ 
managers govern the accumulated sum of money there are also rules that these managers can 
change in the course of time. For instance, governments may decide to stop indexing the growth 
of the pension benefits at consumer price inflation, or may change the pension replacement 
rate.  In  times  of  financial  crises,  incurring  depressed  investment  outcomes,  or  an  ageing 
population, where funds’ expenditures exceed income, there is pressure on fund managers to 
change the rules. The change of rules is particularly problematic when it occurs after retirement 
because the worker is unable to replenish income by working (more) to save more.  
The conclusion of these three benefits for the worker is that it is better to be safe than sorry. It is 
better to take the safer option and have a simple savings account where the accumulation of 
funds during a working lifetime is transparent, in order to be able to adjust labour market 
participation  if  needed.  It  is  better  to  be  aware  of  the  costs  and  outcomes  and  have  low 
investment costs with a fixed return rather than to incur unknown costs in exchange for the 
possibility of high returns (such as investments in equity) and be sorry that pension benefits 
turn out to be lower than expected on  retirement. Last but not least, being independent of 
governments or other fund managers, guarantees no unpleasant surprises will occur at a time 
when the individual worker is no longer able to augment income. 19  
 
6.  So why not implement an individual risk-free pension scheme? 
After examining the ability to pay and the benefits of an individual risk-free pension scheme as 
outlined in the previous sections, the counterarguments are now discussed. What reasons could 
be given why an individual should not favour an individual risk-free pension scheme?  
First, investing in a collective scheme with non-risk free investments can deliver higher returns and 
as  a  consequence  lower  pension  contribution  are  required  in  order  to  reach  lump  sum  at 
retirement. However, it has been shown that the return on pension contributions deposited by 
the worker and the employer in an individual savings account is on average no more than 2% 
points  under  the  return  on  the  same  contribution  deposited  with  a  government  or  other 
pension fund (institutional investors, pension funds, insurance companies). Looking at the gross 
returns in a historical perspective, collective funds only rarely attained an average return of 6% 
whereas, even in times of worldwide low interest rates, the interest rate on a long-term savings 
account (10 years or longer) was 4.0%. Saving deposited in a blocked bank account where the 
funds are not accessible until retirement, often means even longer fixed terms and thus even 
higher interest rates. Apart from Denmark, the global recession years have led to dramatically 
low returns on collective pensions: of 0.8% on average for these 16 EU countries (see Figure 8 
in Peeters, 2011). This evidently shows that the risk of missing-out on the higher returns of the 
more risky investment is outweighed by the risk of unacceptable losses (see Sinha, 2002). 
A second argument against individual (risk-free) pension schemes could be an unwanted shift 
away from the social insurance concept and the tacit solidarity across and within generations. For 
instance, there is no insurance against the risk of the loss of human capital through illness. 
However, these insurances more related to sick pay that either the employer or the government 
is better able to carry. In most of the developed economies, these insurances are part of the 
wider social security system and are not covered by pension funds. Insuring the loss of earnings 
through illness is expensive. Moreover, this solidarity is a social issue and not necessarily the 
responsibility  of  the  individual  employee.  While  collective  pension  schemes  can  relieve 
borrowing constraints and enable intergenerational risk sharing, they usually imposes uniform 
rules  on  heterogeneous  participants  (cited  from  Bovenberg  et  al.,  2007;  see  also  Barr  and 
Diamond, 2006). Pension saving over a lifetime, however, is largely in the hands of the worker. 
Workers  should  not  be  punished  dis-proportionally  more  than  non-workers,  in  view  of 
demographic developments and for the sake of the functioning of the common market single 
currency. Moreover, as Holzmann and Palacios (2001) argue,  individual accounts are a better 
way of dealing with labour market incentives and changing family patterns, such as divorces, 20  
 
multiple marriages or relationships over the life cycle, widowhood, and the resulting need for 
independent old-age security for non-working partners. Under an individual account system, 
accumulated resources can easily be split after a divorce for the period marriage, aggregated 
with own and prior contributions and interest received, and supplemented by public resources 
in a transparent manner (for instance, for periods of child rearing). 
A  third  argument  against  an  individual  (risk-free)  pension  scheme  is  the  risk  of  cover  and 
longevity. In the examples presented in the previous sections, one of the assumptions was that 
workers have perfect foresight and also know how long they will live. If pension savings accrued 
during a working life are estimated to cover 20 retirement years and the worker lives much 
there will clearly be a financial gap at an age when this is difficult to resolve. This is true, but it is 
a surmountable problem. Policy makers could impose the life-expectancy age as a guideline for 
workers  and  the  few  people  who  surpass  this  set  age  could  be  entitled  to  a  special  social 
security benefit. Alternatively, workers could be required by law to save for a minimum of 30 
years retirement. This period is achievable, under reasonable parameter settings, as followed 
from the calculations in section 4.  
A fourth argument against individual (risk-free) pension schemes is that some people  are not 
capable of doing their own financial planning for, such a long period as a lifespan. This objective is 
often raised but, in my view, is rather weak. Learning to plan is an important skill and leaving 
this to others is generally more costly and in case of risk-free saving as outlined in the previous 
sections, there are only few parameters to decide upon (see also Milevsky, 2009; Pozen and 
Hamacher, 2011). The pension contribution rate, as well as the workers and employers’ share, 
should  be  part  of  the  wage-negotiation  process.  The  pension  scheme  is  still  mandatory,  as 
savings have to take place and the money on the savings account is inaccessible (blocked), so 
these are no decisions to make. The worker does not have to make any investment strategy 
decisions, as the bank will save the worker’s funds risk-free at the highest interest rate for each 
payment until retirement.  
There were no other arguments against individual risk-free pension schemes in comparison 
with  collective  riskier  schemes.  I  abstain  here  from  a  term  life  insurance,  which  benefits  a 
worker’s survivors. In case a worker dies, the individual risk-free saved funds are anyhow at the 
disposal of the survivors at the retirement age of the worker. A term life insurance is extremely 
costly (up to 2.5% of the contributions) but often not needed, such as in case the survivor is able 
to work or entitled to other (social security) funds or if there are no survivors. And general risks 
as the inflation risk affect both schemes. 21  
 
7.  Summary, conclusions and policy recommendations 
In the past, the economies of the European Union all started building collective pension funds. 
This emerged at a time when there was a great need for solidarity and intergenerational risk-
sharing. The move towards these two national goals, separately or in combination, was in place 
well before the start of the European Economic and Monetary Union. 
However, times have changed. The European Union now also has a monetary union. The loss of 
national discretion on monetary policy, exchange rates and interest rate instruments, and the 
absence  of  a  common  fiscal  policy  means  that  the  functioning  of  the  labour  market  is  of 
paramount importance. In the absence of a fully functioning fiscal union, only labour mobility 
can cushion the effects of asymmetric shocks that have hit some but not all of the economies of 
the monetary union.  
 In addition, demographic developments mean that the member states are ageing. Moreover, 
working-age populations are shrinking while there are more and more elderly dependents in 
the economy. This puts pressure from demographic change on the working-age population. The 
working-age  population  has  to  adapt  in  order  to  provide  the  needs  in  terms  of  goods  and 
services of an aging society, and have to work more in order to pay the income for the larger 
generation of retirees. In addition, workers should not forget to save for their own retirement. 
To help them achieve this, the working-age populations should be given incentives to be flexible 
in the labour market. 
Although labour mobility in the European Union has significantly risen, it is still low. One of the 
impediments is the non-portability or costly portability of pension schemes for a worker across 
the borders. It would be better to facilitate and give EU workers incentives to cross borders for 
work. This is advantageous to the functioning of the European Union and to absorb the impact 
of demographic change, as explained above. In comparison with other factors that impact labour 
mobility, pensions could be a feasible and effective policy instrument for the EU policy makers 
to increase mobility. 
This paper argues that there are many arguments to move towards individual risk-free pension 
schemes, in particular for workers that cross borders but not exclusively. This type of pension 
scheme is by definition portable across EU-borders. Although it does exists on a very small 
scale, the majority of employers in the EU force their workers into collective schemes. Worker 
cannot opt-out, unless they quit their job. However, once a worker leaves a job, transporting any 
accumulated pension across the EU borders is almost impossible or extremely costly. 22  
 
This idea of an individual risk-free pension schemes hinges on the balance between government 
intervention and freedom of choice, which is often seen as social versus liberal, respectively, in 
the literature. Currently, most first-pillar (but also second-pillar) collective schemes accept a 
government-prescribed straightjacket. And if it is not the government then it is an intermediary 
insurance or pension company making the choices for the employee. The individual risk-free 
scheme promoted here does not fit in this system. Neither does it fit in the freedom of choice 
category, as paying pension contribution is still mandatory and there is no liberty in managing 
the funds due to the risk-free savings. The funds, however, remain in the hands of the worker 
and are thus transparent and portable. 
Apart from enhancing the labour market mobility, there are two other macroeconomic benefits 
from individual risk-free pension schemes. Firstly, the individual character of the scheme will 
create the right incentives and make non- or partly participating working-age persons aware of 
the need to participate and save more funds in order to make ends meet after retirement. This 
incentive to participate (fully) in the labour market could lead to more job vacancies being filled. 
Secondly, individual pension accounts can improve the social insurance aspect of public pension 
schemes, make them financially sustainable and even more redistributive (see Holzmann and 
Palacios, 2001). 
Furthermore, this paper shows that a worker can easily achieve a reasonable pension benefits 
over a long retirement period of 30 years if employers contribute their share of the pension 
savings.  For  workers  retiring  at  the  age  of  67,  30  retirement  years  should  take  them  well 
beyond normal life-expectancy. The nominal pension benefit is thus, without interference of 
others, apart from a solid bank account, fully guaranteed.  
I  further  show  in  this  paper  that  an  individual  risk-free  pension  scheme  has  three  main 
advantages for the employee. First, workers can clearly see  what they will get. Second, the 
financial costs are next to nothing. Third, independent of the whims of government or other 
fund managers and workers will receive all the benefits accrued earned their lifetime.  
As the difference between market returns and risk-free bank savings account has diminished 
over the last decade and public finances are in trouble, there are no arguments from the return 
point of view either to validate forcing workers into collective risky investment schemes.  
A  remaining  question  to  be  answered  concerns  what  actions  are  needed  by  the  EU  policy 
makers to establish the EU-wide implementation of individual risk-free pension schemes. This 
question is easy to answer. Each EU-citizen who takes a job work across an EU border - but 23  
 
within the EU - should be entitled to a long-term interest-bearing bank savings account that 
accumulates the monthly pension contribution. This contribution comes from the employee and 
the employer, where their precise shares should be part of the job negotiation process. The 
savings  account  should  be  an  EU-wide  tax  free,  long-term  interest  bearing  account  that  is 
blocked until the moment this EU-citizen reaches the retirement age, let us say, of 67. This 
account is called blocked as no money can be withdrawn until the owner reaches the age of 67, 
though it should be visible at all times to the owner of the account, so that the contribution 
payments of the employer and interest payments by the bank can be followed in the course of 
time. The banks that offer these bank accounts charges only minor costs, as they have huge 
sums of long-term savings in their possession for which they only have to pay a long-term 
interest rate. This interest rate should be as high as possible, for each payment in the account 
from the payment moment until the retirement age. The total funds on these pension schemes 
accounts should be part of the national deposit guarantee systems, as they are risk free. After 
the age of 67, the EU-citizen receives a monthly payment from this accumulated wealth for a 
predetermined number of years. As our calculations show, thirty years is feasible, so until the 
age of 97. For those exceeding this age, a safety net should be in place.  
At  the  discretion  of  the  national  governments,  the  EU  nations  can  follow  this  stepwise 
implementation of the individual bank-savings-account pension accumulation in the EU. 
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